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CIVIL RIGHTS-REHABILITATION ACT-
HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUAL-The United States
Supreme Court has recently held that school teacher
afflicted with contagious disease of tuberculosis was
a "handicapped individual" within meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act section prohibiting federally
funded state program from discriminating against
handicapped individual solely for reason of
handicap.
School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 107 S. Ct.
1123 (1987).
Gene H. Arline contracted tuberculosis in 1957.' Subsequently, the
disease went into remission. 2 In 1966, Arline was hired as an ele-
mentary school teacher by the Nassau County school system. She
performed her job without incident until 1977, when medical testing
revealed that the tuberculosis had again become active in her system. 3
Testing performed in March and November of 1978 indicated active
tuberculosis. 4 Following her relapses in March and November of
1978, the School Board suspended Arline with pay for the remainder
of each of those school years.5 At the conclusion of the 1978-79
school year, the School Board held a hearing concerning Arline's
1. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1125
(1987). Arline was hospitalized in 1957. Id. She subsequently received chemotherapy
from 1957 to 1960. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 408 So. 2d 706,
707 (1982).
2. 107 S. Ct. at 1125. Tuberculosis is an acute or chronic infection caused
by Mycobacterium tuberculosis. Individuals suffering from tuberculosis often expe-
rience long periods of remission; however the disease may reoccur at any time. THE
MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND TIRAPY p. 113 (15th ed. 1987) [hereinafter
cited as MERCK MANUAl].
3. 107 S. Ct. at 1125. Previous testing in the six years prior to her hiring
and the eleven years subsequent to her hiring indicated that the disease was in
remission. 408 So. 2d at 707.
4. 107 S. Ct. at 1125.
5. Id. Arline tested positive despite receiving continuous chemotherapy fol-
lowing the 1977 test. 408 So. 2d at 707. Individuals receiving drug treatment for
tuberculosis will often continue to test positive for the disease although they are not
contagious while receiving drug therapy. MERCK MANUAL at 114.
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condition. 6 Following that hearing she was discharged because of the
frequent recurrence of her tuberculosis.
7
Initially, Arline sought relief from her dismissal through state
administrative proceedings.8 These proceedings resulted in the State
Board of Education reversing the School Board's decision. The State
Board of Education ordered that Arline be reinstated; however, the
School Board appealed this decision. 9 The District Court of Appeals
of Florida, First District, upheld the School Board's dismissal order.' 0
Arline then filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida." In her suit, Arline alleged that her
dismissal was a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,12 contending that as a result of tuberculosis she qualified as a
"handicapped individual" as defined by the Act.' 3 She further alleged
6. 107 S. Ct. at 1125.
7. 107 S. Ct. at 1125. The School Board stated that Arline was dismissed
"not because she had done anything wrong," but because of the "continued
reoccurence [sic] of her tuberculosis." Id.
8. 408 So. 2d at 707.
9. 408 So. 2d at 707. The State Board of Education ruled that there was
no substantial competent evidence to support the School Board's decision. Id.
10. Id. at 708. The court held that there was substantial competent evidence
to support the School Board's decision as there was medical evidence of record to
the effect that it would be inadvisable for Arline to be in prolonged contact with
young children who are highly susceptible to tuberculosis. The court also rejected
Arline's claim that her contract prevented dismissal for illness by reasoning that this
was limited to a short-term illness. Id. at 707-08.
11. Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla., 772 F.2d 759, 760 (11th
Cir. 1985).
12. 107 S. Ct. at 1126. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 states,
in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined
in Section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency
or by the United States Postal Service .... 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
13. 107 S. Ct. at 1126. Section 7 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as
amended, defines a handicapped individual as follows:
(A) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), the term "handi-
capped individual" means any individual who (i) has a physical or mental
disability which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial
handicap to employment and (ii) can reasonably be expected to benefit in
terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation services provided pur-
suant to subchapters I and III of this chapter.
(B) Subject to the second sentence of this subparagraph, the term,
"handicapped individual" means for purposes of subchapters IV and V of
this chapter, any person who (i) has physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has
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that the School Board violated the Act by firing her despite the fact
that she was "otherwise qualified" 14 for the job if "reasonable
accommodation" 15 was made. Additionally, Arline contended that
the School Board was subject to the Act as it received federal financial
assistance from two federal programs. 16 She also alleged that she had
been denied due process of law and sought relief under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.17
Following a trial the district court held for the defendants on all
counts,"8 finding that the procedures provided by the School Board
a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such impairment.
For purposes of sections 793 and 794 of this title as such sections relate to
employment, such term does not include any individual who is an alcoholic
or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual
from performing the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by
reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat
to property or the safety of others. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (1982).
14. 772 F.2d at 761. " 'Qualified handicapped person' means: (a) With respect
to employment, a handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the job in question ... " 45 C.F.R. 84.3(k)(1)
(1986).
15. 772 F.2d at 761. "A recipient shall make reasonable accommodation to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped
applicant or employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program." 45 C.F.R.
84.12(a) (1986).
16. 772 F.2d at 761. The school system received two types of federal assis-
tance: funds provided under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2854 (now the Education Consolidation and Improvement
Act of 1981, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3876 (1982 and Supp. III), and "impact aid", 20
U.S.C. § 237 (1982 and Supp. III). Title I funds are provided to schools having a
significant number of children from low-income families. Impact aid is allocated to
school districts that are attended by a large number of children of federal employees,
but that have decreased tax revenues owing to federally owned property within the
district. 772 F.2d at 761. " 'Federal financial assistance' means any grant, loan,
contract (other than a procurement contract or a contract of insurance or guaranty),
or any other arrangement by which the Department provides or otherwise makes
available assistance in the form of: (1) Funds; (2) Services of Federal personnel; or
(3) Real and personal property or any interest in or use of such property, including:
(i) Tranfers or leases of such property for less than fair market value or for reduced
consideration; and (ii) Proceeds from a subsequent transfer or lease of such property
if the federal share of its fair market value is not returned to the federal govern-
ment." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(h) (1986).
17. 107 S. Ct. at 1125. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) states, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu-
nities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . ..
18. 772 F.2d at 759. Arline named the School Board of Nassau County and
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and the state administrative proceedings constituted due process of
law. The court then held that the definition of a "handicap" under
the Act did not include contagious diseases, and that the School
Board's duty to protect the public from contagious diseases out-
weighed any duty it might have to provide Arline with other suitable
employment. Finally, the court declared that the federal funds re-
ceived by the School Board did not satisfy the requirements of federal
financial assistance under the Act.' 9
Arline appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. 20 The circuit court reversed the decision of the
district court and remanded to the district court for additional factual
findings. 2' In its decision, the circuit court concluded that the stat-
utory and regulatory language was clear in its intent to include
contagious diseases within the definition of a "handicap." 22 Although
the circuit court found that a contagious disease could constitute a
handicap under the Act, it remanded the case to the district court
for additional findings to determine if Arline was otherwise qualified
for the job if given reasonable accommodation. 23
The School Board appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 24 and affirmed the decision
of the Eleventh Circuit.
25
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority of the Court, 26 began his
analysis by examining the statutory language of the Act, its legislative
history and the pertinent regulations enacted to enforce the Act.
Based upon this analysis he then concluded that Arline had a physical
impairment as defined in the regulations. 27 Since her physical im-
Craig Marsh, Superintendent of Schools of Nassau County, both individually and
in his official capacity, as defendants in her suit. Id.
19. Id. at 761-62.
20. Id. at 760.
21. Id. at 765.
22. Id. at 764.
23. Id. at 765.
24. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 106 S. Ct. 1633 (1986).
25. 107 S. Ct. at 1132.
26. Justice Brennan's majority opinion was joined by Justices Stevens, White,
Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a dis-
senting opinion in which Justice Scalia joined.
27. 107 S. Ct. at 1127. "Physical or mental impairment" means:
(i) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or ana-
tomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: Neurological;
musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs;
cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic;
skin; and endocrine; or (ii) any mental or psychological disorder, such as
mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and
specific learning disabilities. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1986).
[Vol. 26:511
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pairment resulted in hospitalization in 1957, which had substantially
limited her major life activites, 28 and as this hospitalization established
a record of impairment, 29 Arline was a handicapped individual as
defined by the Act.30
The Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's interpretation of the Act
which distinguished between how the impairment affects others and
its physical effect upon the individual.31 Allowing such a distinction,
the Court reasoned, would be inconsistent with the underlying pur-
pose of the Act and would violate congressional intent.3 2 In examining
the legislative history of the Act, the Court noted that Congress was
concerned not only with the effect of an impairment on the individ-
ual, but also with the impairment's effect on others.33 To insure that
those with handicaps are not discriminated against because of the
fear or prejudice of others,3 4 the Court noted that Congress amended
the definition of "handicapped" under the Act to include not only
those who are actually impaired, but also those who are regarded as
impaired. 5 Thus, Congress intended to replace actions based upon
fear and prejudice with medically sound, well reasoned decisions.
Consequently, the Act only grants relief to those who are handicapped
28. 107 S. Ct. at 1127. "Major life activities" means functions such as caring
for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breath-
ing, learning, and working. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1986).
29. 107 S. Ct. at 1127. "Has a record of such an impairment" means has a
history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iii)
(1986).
30. 107 S. Ct. at 1130.
31. 107 S. Ct. at 1128. In rejecting this argument the Court stated: "It would
be unfair to allow an employer to seize upon the distinction between the effects of
a disease on others and the effects of a disease on a patient and use that distinction
to justify discriminatory treatment." Id.
32. 107 S. Ct. at 1128. The Court determined congressional intent by ex-
amining a Senate report prepared in conjunction with the passage of the 1974
amendments to the Act. Id.
33. 107 S. Ct. at 1129. The Court noted that this concern was expressed by
Representative Vanik in connection with his attempt, prior to the passage of the
Rehabilitation Act, to secure passage of legislation prohibiting discrimination against
the handicapped. These remarks are, the Court stated, "a primary signpost on the
road toward interpreting the legislative history of section 504." Id. n.9, citing
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 and n.13 (1985).
34. 107 S. Ct. at 1129.
35. 107 S. Ct. at 1129. In order to ascertain congressional intent the Court
once again relied upon SEN REP. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Id. at
1129, n. 11. The Court also took note of the literature detailing the myths surrounding
certain illnesses and the effect these myths have upon society's perception of those
who have or formerly had such illnesses. Id. n.11-13.
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and otherwise qualified.3 6 The Court held that those with contagious
diseases must be given an opportunity to prove they are otherwise
qualified and should not be excluded from coverage under the Act
on the basis of contagiousness alone.1
7
The Supreme Court then turned to the question of whether Arline
was otherwise qualified for the job of elementary school teacher. In
order to make such a determination the Court formulated a standard38
which requires consideration of the nature, duration, and severity of
the risk of the disease together with the probability of the disease
being transmitted and causing harm.3 9 The Court further noted that
in considering these factors the reasonable medical judgments of
public health officials should be relied upon. 40 Finally, the standard
requires consideration of whether reasonable accommodations are
possible. 41 Since the district court had failed to make the findings
necessary under this standard, the Supreme Court remanded the case
to that court.
42
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion 43 in which he
concluded that as contagious diseases are not specifically mentioned
in the language of the Act, the Act's legislative history or the related
regulations, the definition of a "handicap" under the Act cannot be
expanded to include such diseases. 44 Because of this lack of specifi-
cally expressed congressional intent, the Chief Justice observed that
the states should not be required to accept the expansion of the
36. 107 S. Ct. at 1129-30. The Court concluded that the 1978 amendments
to the Act affirmed this approach by rejecting a proposal to exclude all alcoholics
and drug abusers from the protection of the Act and excluding only those whose
illness threatened others. Id. n.14.
37. Id. at 1129-30.
38. This standard was taken from the amicus curiae brief filed in support of
Petitioners by the American Medical Association. Id. at 1131.
39. 107 S. Ct. at 1131. The test, as set forth by the American Medical
Association states that the following factors would be considered: (a) the nature of
the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is
the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to
third parties), and (d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause
varying degrees of harm. Id.
40. 107 S. Ct. at 1131.
41. 107 S. Ct. at 1131. For a complete definition of "reasonable accommo-
dation" see supra note 15.
42. 107 S. Ct. at 1131-32. The Court noted that the district court made no
findings regarding the duration and severity of Arline's condition, the probability
of her transmitting the disease, whether she was contagious at the time of her
discharge, and whether she could have been reasonably accommodated. Id. at 1131.
43. 107 S. Ct. at 1132. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent.
44. Id. at 1133.
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definition of a "handicap" as they did not accept federal funds with
the knowledge of such a condition.4 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
that expansion of the definition of "handicap" to include persons
with contagious diseases was especially unwarranted when it involved
an area that traditionally had been regulated by both the state and
federal governments. 46 Finally, the Chief Justice stated that the
legislative history of the Act provides no evidence of any congres-
sional intent to widen the coverage of the Act to include those whose
impairments stem from the perception that they are impaired, rather
than from any actual impairment to include those who are suffering
from contagious disease.47 Because of these factors, Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the School Board's acceptance of federal
funds was not a knowing acceptance as it was not unambiguously
clear that a contagious disease would be treated as a "handicap"
under the Act.4
In determining whether a person suffering from a contagious
disease qualifies as a "handicapped individual" under the Act, the
Court relied upon the legislative history of the Act as one basis for
its decision. 49 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was enacted to supplant
and improve the Vocational Rehabilitation Act that was originally
passed in 1920.10 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 included major
revisions of the prior legislation enacted to aid the handicapped.5
Prior legislation had focused on rehabilitating the handicapped by
45. Id. at 1132, citing Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1 (1980).
46. Id. at 1133. Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that state statutes concerning
contagious diseases are broad in scope, covering such issues as quarantines, the
issuance of marriage licenses, compulsory immunization, and reporting requirements.
Id. at 1132 n.2.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1134. Chief Justice Rehnquist notes that the majority can point to
no specific part of the legislative history of the Act that indicates congressional
intent to include contagious diseases within the coverage of the Act. In fact, he
reaches a conclusion contradictory to that of the majority concerning the 1978
amendments to the Act. Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that the 1978 amendments
excluding certain alcoholics and drug abusers from the protection of the Act
demonstrated congressional intent to avoid interfering in areas affecting public health
and safety. Id. at 1134 n.5.
49. 107 S. Ct. at 1126-29.
50. The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1920, 29 U.S.C. § 31 et seq., (1982)
as amended, repealed by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, PuB. L. 93-112, Title V §
500(a), 87 Stat. 390 (1973).
51. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et. seq. (1983 and Supp.
III 1985).
19871
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traditional means, such as training, job placement, and medical
services.12 The Rehabilitation Act -of 1973 retained these traditional
methods of aiding the handicapped, but also added provisions aimed
at preventing discrimination against the handicapped and even man-
dating affirmative action with regard to the handicapped."
Specifically, section 501(b) of the Act requires each unit of the
federal government to prepare affirmative action plans for the hiring,
placement, and advancement of the handicapped.14 Section 503. of
the Act requires affirmative action with regard to qualified handi-
capped individuals by any private employer who receives a govern-
ment contract or subcontract in excess of $2,500.11 Programs receiving
federal funds are prohibited from discriminating against qualified
handicapped individuals by section 504 of the Act.5 6
The central focus of these provisions is the definition of "handi-
capped individual." The Act originally defined such an individual in
terms of a physical or mental disability that resulted in a handicap
to employment.17 However, in 1974 the Act was amended to include
52. Rehabilitation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 7335, as amended, repealed by the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, PuB. L. 93-112 Title V § 500(a), 87 Stat. 390 (1973).
53. The definition of vocational rehabilitation services for the Rehabilitation
Act of 1920 is contained in 29 U.S.C. § 723 (1982). The anti-discrimination and
affirmative action provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 are found at 29
U.S.C. §§ 791(b), 793 and 794 (1982 and Supp. III 1985). For a text of these
provisions see infra notes 54-55.
54. Section 501(b) reads, in pertinent part:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality ... in the executive branch
shall . . . submit to the Civil Service Commission and to the Committee an
affirmative action program plan for the hiring, placement, and advancement
of handicapped individuals in such department, agency, or instrumentality.
Such plan shall include a description of the extent to which and methods
whereby the special needs of handicapped employees are being met.... 29
U.S.C. § 791(b) (1982 and Supp. III 1985).
55. Section 503, in pertinent part, reads:
Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or
agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services
(including construction) for the United States shall contain a provision re-
quiring that in employing persons to carry out such contract the party
contracting with the United States shall take affirmative action to employ and
advance in employment qualified handicappel individuals as defined in section
706(8)(b) of this title. The provisions of this section shall apply to any
subcontract in excess of $2,500 entered into by a prime contractor in carrying
out any contract for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal
services (including construction) for the United States .... 29 U.S.C. § 793
(1982).
56. For the text of section 504 see supra note 12.
57. Section 7 of the Rehabilitation Act originally read:
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a more expansive definition of a "handicapped individual.""8 The
definition was revised to include those individuals whose physical or
mental disabilities substantially limit any "major life activity", not
merely employability; those individuals who have a record of an
impairment even if the impairment is no longer present; and those
individuals regarded as having an impairment, even if the individual
is not actually impaired. 9
The definition of "handicapped individual" was revised again in
1978, when Congress amended the definition to exclude alcoholics
or drug abusers whose current substance abuse prevents them from
performing the job or who pose a threat to others.60 Although the
definition of a "handicapped individual" was amended twice in five
years, the legislative history is silent regarding how Congress arrived
at the definition of a "handicapped individual". 6' Therefore, the
Court had little legislative history upon which to rely in its analysis.
As a result, the Court focused upon what it considered the "plain
meaning" of the term.
62
The Court noted that one of the main purposes of the Act was to
prevent discrimination against the handicapped. It then addressed the
The term "handicapped individual" means any individual who (A) has a
physical or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or results
in a substantial handicap to employment and (B) can reasonably be expected
to benefit in terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation services
provided pursuant to Titles I and III of this Act. Rehabilitation Act of 1973
§ 7, 87 Stat. 361 (1973).
58. Section 7 of the Rehabilitation Act read as follows after amendment in
1974:
Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), the term "handicapped
individual" means any individual who (i) has a physical or mental disability
which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to
employment and (ii) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of
employability from vocational rehabilitation services provided pursuant to
subchapters I and III of this chapter. (B) Subject to the second sentence of
this subparagraph, the term "handicapped individual" means, for the purposes
of subchapters IV and V of this chapter, any person who (i) has a physical
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's
major life activities, (ii) is regarded as having such an impairment, or (iii) is
regarded as having such an impairment. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of
1974, Title I § 111(a), 88 Stat. 1619 (1974).
59. Id.
60. For the current text of Section 7 see supra note 13. The provision
excluding alcoholics and drug addicts under certain circumstances was included in
the Rehabilitation Amendments of 1978, 89 Stat. 2-5 (1978).
61. For a legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 see 1973 U.S.
CODE CONG & AD. NEWS p. 2076; 1974 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS p.
6373 and 1978 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS p. 7312.
62. 107 S.Ct. at 1130.
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issue of how the amended definition of a "handicapped individual"
could effectuate this purpose. 6 After examining a Senate report issued
in conjunction with the passage of the 1974 amendments to the Act,
the Court concluded that the amended definition of a "handicapped
individual" was intended to prevent discrimination against a broad
range of individuals who might be perceived as handicapped by an
insensitive American citizenry. 64 Furthermore, the Court determined
that Congress intended no distinction between the effect of an
individual's impairment on that individual and the effect of the
impairment on others. 65 The Court opined that such a distinction
would violate one of the basic purposes of the Act, which is to
insure that handicapped individuals are not discriminated against
because of the biases of others. 6 The amended definition, the Court
noted, took into account the fact that an individual could be hand-
icapped as much by the ignorance and fear of society as by an actual
physical or mental impairment. 67 Rather than totally excluding an
individual from the protection of the Act because of the effect his/
her impairment could have upon others, the Court reasoned that the
limitation within the Act which protects only those individuals who
are "otherwise qualified" from discrimination would work to exclude
those individuals whose impairments would seriously affect others.
68
In its analysis, the Court also relied upon the regulations prom-
ulgated to enforce section 504, as they were drafted with the approval
of Congress. 69 The Court determined that these regulations were
especially significant as they define two important concepts used in
determining who is a "handicapped individual": "physical
impairment" 70 and "major life activities." '7' After examining both
63. Id. at 1128-30.
64. Id. at 1127.
65. Id. at 1128-29.
66. Id. at 1130.
67. Id. at 1129.
68. Id. at 1130. In making this determination the Court stated:
The fact that some persons who have contagious diseses may pose a serious
health threat to others under certain circumstances does not justify excluding
from the coverage of the Act all persons with actual or perceived contagious
diseases. Such exclusion would mean that those accused of being contagious
would never have the opportunity to have their condition evaluated in light
of medical evidence and a determination made as to whether they were
"otherwise qualified." (Emphasis in original.)
69. Id. at 1127, citing Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624
(1984) and Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
70. For a complete definition of this term see supra note 27.
71. For a complete definition of this term see supra note 28.
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the statutory and regulatory framework of the Act, the Court con-
cluded it was evident that Arline was a "handicapped individual".
7 2
The Court cited no case law directly relating to the issue of who
is a "handicapped individual." The Court has had no previous
opportunity to make this determination. Also, there has been little
significant litigation in other courts involving this issue. Although
various courts have made decisions concerning whether certain indi-
viduals meet the definition of a "handicapped individual," these
decisions, on the whole, provide no useful principles for a general
analysis that can be applied in subsequent cases.
73
After determining that Arline was a "handicapped individual"
under the Act, the Court next examined the issue of whether Arline
was "otherwise qualified" under the Act.74 In making such a deter-
mination the Court utilized its holding in Southeastern Community
College v. Davis.75 In Davis the Court held that the college had not
violated section 504 when it excluded a seriously hearing impaired
applicant from its nursing program. 76 The Court reasoned that the
applicant, who could only understand the speech of others by li-
preading, could be excluded from the nursing program as the ability
to hear the spoken word was a legitimate requirement for the
program. 77 The Court held that the individual must be able to meet
the requirements of a program in spite of the handicap,7 and that
the college did not have to make extensive modifications in its
program which would substantially change the nature of the program
in order to accommodate a handicapped individual. 79 In particular,
the Court noted that section 504 does not require affirmative actions
with regard to the handicapped, it only prohibits discrimination
against "otherwise qualified handicapped individuals". 0
72. 107 S. Ct. at 1130.
73. In Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 729, 744 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
the district court stated: "Very few cases spend much time on the issue, as the issue
usually requires little analysis."
74. 107 S. Ct. at 1130. The Court noted that the determination of whether
an individual is "otherwise qualified" must be made on the basis of individualized
facts and not on the basis of prejudice, stereotypes or fear. Id. at 1131.
75. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
76. Id. at 414.
77. Id. at 407. The Court accepted the findings of the district court regarding
the level of hearing necessary to perform the duties of a nurse. Id. at 407. The
district court found inter alia that normal hearing was essential in settings requiring
the wearing of surgical masks. Id. at 403.
78. Id. at 406.
79. Id. at 405.
80. Id. at 409-410.
1987]
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In order to determine whether Arline would be considered an
"otherwise qualified handicapped individual" in spite of her conta-
gious disease, the Court concluded that it was necessary to take
certain factors regarding her disease into consideration."' The Court
adopted a standard set forth in the amicus curiae brief filed by the
American Medical Association.8 2 This standard requires an inquiry,
based upon "reasonable medical judgments" regarding the nature,
duration, and severity of the risk, including such factors as the
manner in which the disease is transmitted, the length of time the
carrier is infectious, and the effects of the disease upon others. 3 The
Court stressed that the basis for this standard should be "reasonable
medical judgments of public health officials, '8 4 and that courts
should defer to the judgments of these officials in making such a
determination with regard to an individual with a contagious disease.
85
The Court then held that once a determination has been made
regarding the risk a contagious individual poses, a finding must be
made as to whether the individual can be "reasonably accommo-
dated," as set forth in Davis 6 and the pertinent regulations. 7
The Court's decision to include persons suffering from contagious
diseases within the definition of a "handicapped individual" is a
sound one. As the Court emphasized in its opinion, the plain meaning
of the statutory and regulatory language requires such a finding. 8
Given the regulatory definition of a "physical impairment" it would
be incongruous to exclude persons with contagious diseases from the
definition of a "handicapped individual".
The Court's reluctance to exclude persons with contagious diseases
from the protection of the Act based solely upon the fact such
diseases may affect others is also sound. The Act does exclude
alcoholics and drug addicts whose condition prevents them from
performing a job or threatens the safety of others; however, it does
81. 107 S. Ct. at 1131. See supra note 39 for discussion of these factors.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The Court did not reach a decision regarding the weight to be given
to the judgments of private physicians when such opinions are relied upon by
employers. Id. at 1131 n.18.
85. Id.
86. Id. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text for discussion of the
in spite of the handicap standard.
87. Id. For a full text of the regulations defining reasonable accommodation
see supra note 15.
88. Id. at 1127-30.
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not exclude all such persons from the protection of the Act. s9 The
Court reasoned that a person with a contagious disease should be
excluded from the Act's protection only if that person fails to show
that he or she is a "handicapped individual," who is also "otherwise
qualified" in spite of the handicap. 90 The requirement that a "hand-
icapped individual" be "otherwise qualified" offers a protection
against those individuals whose contagious diseases would threaten
the health of others.
The Court adopted a well reasoned standard formulated by health
care professionals to make determinations concerning the risk an
individual with a contagious disease poses to others. 91 If this standard
is properly implemented the safety of others will be adequately
protected, and the rights of persons with contagious diseases will be
protected.
In the dissenting opinion which he authored, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist relied heavily upon the majority opinion he wrote in Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Halderman92 to justify the exclusion of
individuals with contagious diseases from the definition of a "hand-
icapped individual" under the Act. 93
In Pennhurst, Halderman, a retarded resident of a state institution,
brought a class action suit in federal court against the institution and
various of its officials alleging violations of constitutional rights and
statutory rights, including rights under section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act and the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act. 94 The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act was enacted to provide a program of federal grants to
the states for the purpose of assisting the states in establishing
programs for the developmentally disabled. 95 The Act includes a "bill
89. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (1982). For a full text of this section see supra note
13.
90. 107 S. Ct. at 1130.
91. Id. at 1131.
92. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
93. 107 S. Ct. at 1132.
94. 451 U.S. at 6. The complaint, as amended, averred, inter alia, that
conditions at Pennhurst were dirty, inhumane and unsafe. The complaint also
averred that these inadequate conditions violated the right of the class to due process
and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment; constituted cruel and unusual
punishment under the eighth amendment; and denied them their rights under the
Pennsylvania Mental Health and Retardation Act of 1966, the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 and Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. The
plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief along with requesting that Pennhurst
be closed and the residents be placed in community living arrangments. Id.
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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of rights" for the developmentally disabled stating that the devel-
opmentally disabled have a right to treatment, services, and habili-
tation in the least restrictive environment. 96 The United States District
Court found that Halderman's rights had been violated and ordered
that Pennhurst be closed and community living arrangements be
provided for residents. 91 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit basically affirmed, finding that the Act created sub-
stantive rights for the developmentally disabled, including an implied
cause of action to enforce the right to adequate treatment, services,
and habilitation.98 However, the court did not affirm the closing of
Pennhurst and instead remanded for individual determination re-
garding placement of residents. 99
The Supreme Court, per then Justice Rehnquist's opinion, re-
versed. 00 The Court held that the "bill of rights" provision of the
Act was merely an expression of Congress' preference for certain
types of treatment, and that as the Act was only a federal-state
funding measure, substantive rights could not be implied from the
Act. They had to be affirmatively created within the Act. 10 The
Court held that such rights must be created affirmatively as federal-
state funding programs are similar to contracts, and the states cannot
knowingly accept the terms of such contracts, i.e., creation of certain
substantive rights, unless they are unambiguously expressed. 0 2 The
96. 42 U.S.C. § 6009 (Supp. III 1985).
97. 451 U.S. at 7-8. The district court found that conditions at Pennhurst
were inadequate and dangerous. It found that these conditions violated the residents'
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" in the "least restrictive environment."
Further, the court found that these conditions violated the residents' rights under
the eighth amendment, the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, and section 201 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and
Mental Retardation Act. The court appointed a special master to supervise a plan
designed to improve conditions at Pennhurst while making arrangements to close
the institution and place all residents in community living arrangments. Id.
98. Id. at 8-9. The circuit court rejected the district court's reliance on
constitutional claims relying instead on the residents' statutory rights, specifically
their right to appropriate treatment in the least restrictive environment as provided
by the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. The court also
appied the test set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) to find an implied
cause of action to enforce the rights provided by the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act and the state mental health act. Id.
99. Id. at 9. The court stated that a presumption should be made in favor
of placing residents in "community living arrangements." Id.
100. Id. at 32.
101. Id. at 19.
102. Id. at 17.
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Court made no finding regarding Halderman's rights under section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 103
Chief Justice Rehnquist relied upon this holding to state, in the
instant case, that because Congress did not expressly include persons
with contagious diseases within the definition of a "handicapped
individual," Congress did not unambiguously attach the obligation
to include such persons within the definition upon those programs
that receive federal funds subject to the provisions of the Rehabili-
tation Act. 1°4
In a footnote to the majority opinion, Justice Brennan noted that
the anti-discrimination provisions of section 504 are more than gen-
eral expressions of congressional preference, and therefore, can be
distinguished from the provisions at issue in Pennhurst.°0 Pennhurst
is also distinguishable from the instant case because the Rehabilitation
Act clearly creates substantive rights and a cause of action for those
who have been discriminated against in contravention of section
504.106 Thus, unlike Halderman, Arline was not attempting to create
a new cause of action, but was attempting to enforce her rights
under an established cause of action. Furthermore, the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 is more than a federal-state funding measure. It is
distinguishable from the legislation at issue in Pennhurst because it
includes provisions prohibiting discrimination against the handi-
capped, even mandating affirmative action in certain instances.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also criticized the majority for failing to
exclude persons with contagious diseases from the purview of the
Act upon the basis that their condition can pose a threat to the
health or safety of others. 0 7 He illustrated his point by noting
alcoholics and drug addicts who pose a threat to the health or safety
of others are excluded from coverage under the Act.108 However, he
fails to mention that the majority opinion provides a process for
excluding those individuals with contagious diseases who pose a threat
to others. According to the majority opinion, in order to determine
103. Id. at 31. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court for consid-
eration of this issue.
104. 107 S. Ct. at 1132-33.
105. Id. at 1130 n.15.
106. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2) (1982) states: The remedies, procedures, and rights
set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be available to any person
aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of federal assistance or
federal provider of such assistance under section 794 of this title.
107. 107 S. Ct. at 1133.
108. Id. at 1134 n.5.
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if a handicapped individual is "otherwise qualified" an analysis of
the risk posed to others must be conducted and the medical judgments
of public health officials must be deferred to in such matters. 1°9
Chief Justice Rehnquist failed to discuss this analysis in his dissenting
opinion. Rather than provide persons with contagious diseases a fair
opportunity to prove they pose no threat to others, he would exclude
them totally from the protection of the Act. 110 This would deprive
persons with such diseases from the protection given to all other
handicapped individuals, including alcoholics and drug addicts, who
are given an opportunity to prove they pose no threat to others.1 '
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion adopts reasoning similar to that
expressed by the Department of Justice in a ruling issued prior to
the decision in Arline."2 In the ruling, the department concluded that
under section 504 it was impermissible to discriminate against an
individual suffering from the disabling effects of AIDS. However
the department further concluded it was permissible to discriminate
against an individual if it was believed the individual was capable of
transmitting the disease, even if such individual was also suffering
from the disabling effects of AIDS." 3 The department reasoned this
was permissible as Congress did not specifically include contagious
diseases within the scope of the Rehabilitation Act. Also, the de-
partment reasoned, contagiousness alone could not be considered an
impairment. Therefore, a carrier of contagious diseases would not
be considered a "handicapped individual" under the Act." 4 However,
both the department and Chief Justice Rehnquist failed to acknowl-
edge that the Act's provision which states a "handicapped individual"
must be "otherwise qualified" provides adequate protection against
persons whose conditions threaten others. Consequently, a wholesale
exclusion of those with contagious diseases from protection under
the Act is neither warranted nor necessary.
In another era the Court's decision to include persons with con-
tagious diseases within the definition of a "handicapped individual"
109. Id. at 1131.
110. Id. at 1133-34.
111. This provision is set forth in Section 7. For a text of this section see
supra note 13.
112. On June 23, 1986 the Department of Justice issued a ruling on the issue
of AIDS and section 504.at the request of the Office of the General Counsel for
the Department of Health and Human Services. Controversial Ruling by Justice
Department on AIDS, Labor Rel. Rep. p. 129 (BNA) (June 30, 1986).




under the Act might not have gained much attention. Given the
current state of medical technology, contagious diseases, such as
tuberculosis, are not generally viewed with great alarm in this country.
However, with the advent of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS)' 5 in the 1980's much attention is once again focused on a
contagious disease." 6 Although the instant case concerned an indi-
vidual suffering from tuberculosis, it would seem safe to assume that
the most common future application of the holding in this case will
occur in cases involving AIDS, although it may also be applied to
other contagious diseases that invoke fear, such as hepatitis B" 7 or
leprosy.
A year prior to the decision in the instant case, a New York state
court determined that those individuals suffering from AIDS and
those who have been identified as carriers of the AIDS virus, even
though they are currently asymptomatic, are "handicapped indivi-
duals" under the Act."' After the decision in Arline there seems
little question that this was a correct interpretation of the Act.
It is clear that those individuals actually suffering from AIDS will
be included in the definition of "handicapped individual"; however,
the question then becomes: is such an individual "otherwise quali-
fied." At that point the standard formulated by the Supreme Court
to make such a determination will be utilized. As the Court's standard
relies upon the judgment of public health officials, it would seem
that such determinations will be made with concern for the health
of others, yet without regard to the hysteria with which the disease
is viewed by some members of the public.
115. "AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome)-an illness caused by the
retrovirus HTLV-III and characterized by one or more opportunistic infections that
indicate underlying cellular immunodeficiency." Dowdie "AIDS: What Is It?", J.
Am. Pub. Welfare (Summer 1986) p. 14 at 17.
116. AIDS is a contagious disease. Present research indicates that it is trans-
mitted through sexual contact, transfusions of contaminated blood or blood products,
sharing needles with an infected intravenous drug user or from infected mother to
fetus during pregnancy. There is currently no indication that AIDS is transmitted
through casual non-sexual contact. "Surgeon General's Report on Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome," Department of Health and Human Services (1986).
117. Viral hepatitis is a contagious disease that causes inflammation of the
liver. The B virus is considered to be especially contagious. It has a long incubation
period allowing those infected with the virus, but not symptomatic to spread the
disease to others before it can be isolated. Also, there are persons who are chronic
carriers of the virus without suffering the effects of the disease. MERCK MANuAL at
857-65.
118. District 27 Community School Bd. v. Bd. of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398,
502 N.Y.S. 2d 325 (1986).
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Another problem which could arise is the issue of whether those
who are not acutally suffering from AIDS, but who have AIDS
related complex (ARC)119 or who have merely tested positive for the
AIDS virus, 120 but are currently asymptomatic are"handicapped in-
dividuals" within the meaning of the Act. In Arline, such an issue
was not presented and the Court specifically declined to make a
determination of this issue. 2 1 An individual suffering from ARC
could have the requisite physical impairment to qualify as a "hand-
icapped individual". However, an individual who has merely tested
positive for the AIDS virus may also be classified as a "handicapped
individual," as that individual may be "regarded as having an
impairment" by others who will view such a person as impaired,
even though the individual suffers no symptoms and may never
develop the disease. 122 Although it may be argued, as evidenced by
the Department of Justice's ruling, that an individual who is not
suffering from the effects of a disease but is only a carrier of the
disease does not have the necessary impairment to be considered a
"handicapped individual" under the Act, it should be noted that a
carrier can satisfy the definition of a "handicapped individual" by
virtue of the perception by others that all AIDS carriers suffer from
the disabling effects of the disease. Therefore, the carrier will be
"regarded as having an impairment" and will meet the definition of
a "handicapped individual".
An even greater extension of the definition of a "handicapped
individual" could occur should an individual in one of the groups
at high risk to develop AIDS seek protection under the Act. 2a For
119. "ARC (AIDS-related complex)-a combination of physical problems, ex-
isting over time, that indicates infection of a person with HTLV-III. Symptoms
include fatigue, fever, weight loss, diarrhea, night sweats, and swollen lymph nodes."
Dowdle, supra at 17.
120. "Seropositive status-means that testing has identified antibody to HTLV-
III in a person's blood and that the person has at some time been infected by the
virus. The test does not indicate whether or not the person will eventually develop
AIDS." Id.
121. 107 S. Ct. at 1128 n.7.
122. See supra note 120 for a discussion of those who have tested positive for
the AIDS virus, but do not currently exhibit symptoms of the disease. Although
such individuals are asymptomatic they are still capable of infecting others. "Surgeon
General's Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome" at 5.
123. High risk groups include: homosexual and bisexual men; present or past
intravenous drug users; persons with clinical or laboratory evidence of infection;
persons born in countries where heterosexual transmission is thought to play a major
role in the spread of the virus; male or female prostitutes and their sex partners;
sex partners of infected persons or persons at high risk; persons with hemophilia
who have received blood products; and newborn infants of high-risk or infected
mothers. Dowdle, supra at 16.
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example, a male homosexual could be denied access to a federally
funded program on the basis of the fear that he is an AIDS carrier
or a potential AIDS carrier. It is possible that such an individual
could be considered a"handicapped individual" on the basis that he
is regarded as having an impairment. To take this example even
further, one who is merely perceived as being homosexual, or who
has many homosexual friends, could be protected under the Act, if
these factors lead to a perception that the individual has AIDS or is
an AIDS carrier. However, given the current climate with regard to
AIDS such an extension of the definition may not occur. Further-
more, although such an extension of the definition of a "handicapped
individual" would not be condoned by a significant portion of
society, certain factors should be kept in mind. First, the scope of
the Rehabilitation Act's definition of a "handicapped individual" is
very limited, in that it applies only to the federal government, federal
contracts and federal programs. 124 Secondly, the test promulgated by
the Court to determine if an individual is "otherwise qualified" will
act as a significant safeguard to the public health, and will also
insure that those with diseases such as AIDS are not discriminated
against irrationally. Finally, the test established by the Court will
also insure that the public health and safety will not be threatened
in the pursuit of individual rights.
The Court's decision to include contagious diseases within the
Rehabilitation Act's definition of a "handicap" may result in an
increase in litigation concerning its application to diseases such as
AIDS. However, the test promulgated by the Court to determine if
an individual is entitled to protection under the Act will balance
public safety and individual rights in such a manner so as to insure
that neither is unduly compromised.
Susan Paczak
124. For the full text of these provisions see supra notes 12, 54 and 55.
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